Understanding Moral Skepticism

In today's society, moral judgments and outrage are ubiquitous, particularly on social media platforms. But what if the foundation of these moral assertions is fundamentally flawed? This is the premise of moral skepticism, which questions the existence of genuine moral knowledge.

According to Richard Joyce's insightful essay in the anthology Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present, edited by Diego Machuca and Baron Reed (Bloomsbury Academic, 2018), there are three primary forms of moral skepticism:

1. Non-cognitivism: Moral statements do not express beliefs.
2. Error theory: Moral statements express beliefs, but those beliefs can never be true.
3. Justification skepticism: Moral beliefs may exist, but we lack sufficient justification for them.

To contextualize these ideas, we can refer back to Plato's definition of knowledge as justified true belief. This implies that for any claim—such as “an eclipse will occur tomorrow”—to be considered knowledge, it must meet three criteria:

• Belief: I must genuinely believe the claim.
• Truth: The claim must be accurate; there must indeed be an eclipse.
• Justification: I need to provide a valid reason for my belief. If my only source is a newspaper, that might not be adequate justification. Genuine knowledge requires thorough understanding or verified information.

In essence, applying Plato’s definition reveals that we often lack true knowledge about what we claim to know. For instance, can I assert that quantum mechanics is accurate? Not really; I merely repeat what I've heard.

Now, returning to the different forms of moral skepticism, both non-cognitivism and error theory represent a form of anti-realism regarding morality. Philosophically, anti-realism suggests disbelief in the existence of a certain concept. For instance, atheists are anti-realists concerning God, just as non-cognitivists and error theorists reject the reality of moral judgments.

However, moral skepticism does not automatically denote anti-realism. It is conceivable to hold true moral beliefs without being able to substantiate them. For example, I might believe that the square root of nine is three, but my inability to provide proof does not negate the truth of that belief. In parallel, a justification skeptic might acknowledge that some moral beliefs could be accurate, yet insist that we cannot justify them, thus undermining our claim to knowledge.

Non-cognitivism, which can be traced back to 18th-century philosopher David Hume, gained traction through the works of logical positivists like Rudolf Carnap and Alfred J. Ayer in the early 20th century.

This view posits that moral statements, while appearing to be assertions, are not truly so. When someone declares, “genocide is wrong,” they are essentially expressing disapproval rather than making a factual claim. This interpretation is supported by empirical studies highlighting the relationship between moral judgments and emotional responses, particularly disgust. However, while emotions play a role in moral discourse, they do not entirely define it.

Error theory, on the other hand, contends that while we make moral assertions (cognitivism), the structure of reality does not allow us to label these assertions as “true” or “false.” John Mackie's influential work, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (1977), serves as a cornerstone for this perspective, although earlier thinkers like Anaxarchus, who journeyed to India with Pyrrho, are also noted for their contributions to this line of thought.

To illustrate error theory, consider an atheist's perspective on religious statements. The claim “God loves us” is deemed nonsensical as the concept of God does not exist, rendering the theist's assertion erroneous. Similarly, saying “to steal is wrong” is based on the mistaken belief that “wrong” signifies a real-world category.

For error theorists, concepts like good and bad do not exist in the universe; they are human constructs. Outside of a religious context, it is challenging to justify the notion that moral properties are inherent in the world. Much like beauty, they are subjective interpretations.

Lastly, justification skepticism suggests that while moral judgments may be cognitive and possibly true, we lack the epistemic basis to assert them confidently. One rationale for adopting this skeptical view is Agrippa’s first mode, which emphasizes the widespread disagreement on moral issues among knowledgeable individuals. If such disagreements exist, how can we confidently assert one viewpoint over another?

I apply this skepticism to scientific debates where I lack expertise, such as the contention between string theory and loop quantum gravity in unifying physics. Even experts in the field seem unsure, making suspension of judgment a prudent approach.

Despite claims of universal moral disagreement, research indicates that many moral principles are consistent across cultures. For example, the prohibition against murder is universally upheld, as societies that condone such actions are unlikely to survive.

Ultimately, while all three forms of moral skepticism merit consideration, I propose an alternative stance that lies between moral realism and anti-realism, known as moral quasi-realism, as articulated by philosopher Simon Blackburn. I will not delve into Blackburn's interpretation, as my variant, often labeled nativism, diverges from his perspective.

Nativism posits that human moral reasoning has evolved as a distinct psychological adaptation. As an evolutionary biologist, I contend that human behaviors, whether biological or cultural, have evolved, sometimes adaptively and sometimes not. The foundational elements of morality are observable in other social primates, manifesting as instincts that promote cooperation and altruism.

This suggests that humans have retained these instincts, explaining our visceral reactions to morally unacceptable behaviors, and have developed them further through language, giving rise to cultural norms. While some norms vary across time and cultures, others—like prohibitions against murder and theft—are more stable, reflecting behaviors conducive to social living.

From an evolutionary ethics perspective, fundamental moral rules can be deemed objectively beneficial or detrimental, which is a more fitting categorization than “true” or “false.” This aligns with the Stoic philosophy of living in accordance with human nature, characterized by reason and social cooperation. The Stoics encapsulated this idea with their motto: “live according to (human) nature.”