Chapter 1: Understanding Naturalism's Foundations

In this dialogue, I engaged in a discussion via email with Prudence Louise, a supporter of classical theism, regarding the coherence and validity of philosophical naturalism.

Prudence Louise:

Naturalism is the primary perspective in today’s society. We are frequently told that science has shown the universe to be devoid of purpose and consciousness; it suggests there is no divine being, no souls, and no afterlife.

Science has not identified anything supernatural or beyond the natural realm. It has not found evidence supporting the existence of deities, souls, or even mythical entities like ghosts and fairies, which lie outside the purview of physics.

These assertions of non-existence implicitly endorse the validity of naturalism, not merely as a scientific methodology but as a metaphysical stance. Naturalism posits that the natural world encompasses all that exists. The absence of scientific discovery regarding deities, souls, or supernatural beings is often interpreted to imply their non-existence.

It is uncontroversial to assert that science has not uncovered these phenomena; this is undoubtedly true. However, this is not surprising, as science does not seek them out. The scientific method is intentionally limited to explanations that are objective and quantifiable.

The naturalistic scientific approach has achieved remarkable success. In their enthusiasm for this success, some proponents have attempted to extend this method to assert that all explanations must align with scientific knowledge. This shift from appreciating a methodology to asserting a philosophical stance is significant.

This philosophical viewpoint is referred to as naturalism, physicalism, or materialism. All these terms relate to the notion that only what is revealed through the natural sciences is real. Materialism claims that only matter exists; physicalism argues that only physical entities exist, while naturalism maintains that everything is part of the natural order.

These philosophies capitalize on the authority of science to validate their claims, misleadingly suggesting that scientific inquiry has confirmed philosophical naturalism. The term "naturalism" is often used interchangeably with science and philosophy. Initially, the undeniable achievements of the natural sciences are presented, then naturalism is seamlessly integrated into philosophical assertions.

For instance, the well-known atheist Richard Dawkins states, "The universe that we observe has precisely the properties we should expect if there is, at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil, no good, nothing but pitiless indifference."

This is a philosophical assertion: that the universe lacks purpose, consciousness, good, or evil. However, who is observing this indifferent and meaningless universe? His assertion holds true only if "we" refers to the scientific perspective, suggesting that this viewpoint is the sole method of observing reality.

We often overlook how unusual this worldview is, as "we" typically signifies "humans." If we consider "we" to mean humans with functional sensory organs, the world we perceive is anything but indifferent. We experience a vibrant world filled with colors, tastes, sounds, and aromas. Its beauty can be overwhelming, invoking a sense of wonder at its diverse harmony and movement. Rather than being apathetic, it provides us with the essentials for life and beyond, offering delights as well.

Anyone who has deeply engaged with nature does not emerge with Dawkins' bleak interpretation. His perspective reflects a nihilistic viewpoint akin to that of a clinically depressed individual.

Only by adopting a strictly scientific lens does the universe fit his description. The scientific method deliberately excludes subjective attributes from its explanations. The absence of measurable empirical properties such as good, evil, purpose, and indifference does not imply that the universe lacks these qualities.

Even when we recognize the distinction between naturalism as a methodology and naturalism as a metaphysical stance, we must still assess the consistency of the metaphysical assertion. The efficacy of the scientific method is not in question; that is widely acknowledged.

However, we must examine the validity of the philosophical claim. Does the success of science warrant the extension of a scientific perspective to all aspects of existence?

To determine if everything is indeed natural or physical, we must first define what "natural" or "physical" entails. Upon investigation, we find that there is no clear definition, and all attempts to articulate naturalism falter. Any definition we adopt renders naturalism either false or devoid of meaning.

This issue was famously articulated by philosopher Carl Hempel, known as "Hempel's dilemma." The physicalist is faced with two choices. If they define "physical" based on current physics, then physicalism is false, as no one considers current physics to be comprehensive, and mental properties remain outside its scope.

Alternatively, if the definition of the physical is based on an ideal future physics, then physicalism becomes vacuous, as no one can predict what that future physics might entail. Such unknowns could encompass souls, deities, fairies, and ghosts, leading to a situation where physicalism is rendered meaningless. When physicalists assert that everything is physical, they are uncertain about what "physical" actually means.

This incoherence may not seem as evident if naturalism were presented as a tentative belief or a humble proposition. Yet, it is often delivered with such unwarranted confidence that dissenters are labeled as science deniers or irrational dreamers.

We are presented with an expansive ontological thesis regarding all of reality, a thesis whose fundamental term remains undefined. This illustrates that naturalism does not begin with observations of the world and construct its metaphysical framework logically. Rather, it starts with a method of exploring the world and attempts to constrict reality to fit this chosen method.

Benjamin Cain:

The initial two-thirds of Prudence's introduction seem to be much ado about nothing.

She misrepresents naturalism by equating it with positivism. Naturalism is a philosophy, and contemporary naturalistic philosophers comprehend that science alone does not necessitate naturalism. If it did, there would be little left for philosophers to contribute.

Naturalism is a philosophical extrapolation from scientific theories. One states or defends naturalism through philosophical discourse, not scientific inquiry, even though it is a modern philosophy informed by scientific insights.

Those who were misled in a manner similar to Prudence's explanation were the positivists. They undermined their own foundation by asserting that statements are meaningless unless they are trivially true by logic or empirically falsifiable, thus making them scientifically relevant. These positivists were anti-philosophical philosophers, and their agenda collapsed when some of their empiricist colleagues recognized the incoherence in their views.

Naturalism differs from positivism, and it is important for theists to avoid misrepresenting it. One key aspect of naturalism that I learned in graduate philosophy courses is the conception of nature as comprising levels of properties or patterns alongside their corresponding autonomous discourses.

For instance, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy complicates its basic definition of physicalism by stating that while certain entities may not initially appear physical, they are ultimately physical or possess a significant relationship to the physical realm. This "important relationship" is referred to as "supervenience," leading to what is technically called "property dualism."

Imagine a hierarchy of patterns or disciplines, extending from physics to chemistry, biology, psychology, sociology, economics, and beyond. Each domain addresses specific patterns, and all are natural because their foundations align with what is elucidated by the hard sciences like physics.

The higher levels metaphysically rely on the lower ones, as illustrated by Prudence's misinterpretation of Dawkins' assertion that the universe unfolds just as "we should expect if there is, at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil, no good, nothing but pitiless indifference." The crucial phrase often overlooked is "at bottom." Dawkins operates under the assumption of this layered understanding of nature; his point is that physicists do not need to posit teleological or moral qualities in their inquiries.

This mirrors the error Prudence made in our first debate when she neglected my use of "fundamentally" in stating that "nature is fundamentally mindless." Similar to Dawkins, I was assuming a layered nature, positing that mental properties are genuine, yet they emerge from non-mental physical and biological properties.

The more compelling issue for me is whether "naturalism" can be defined in a meaningful, viable manner. Carl Hempel highlighted this concern, noting that naturalists regard physics as empirically fundamental, yet current physics remains incomplete. If we reference future physics, we risk opening the door to theories that may seem fantastical or unscientific today but could resonate with future scientists.

If physics eventually resembles theology centuries from now, what rationale do naturalists have for dismissing theistic beliefs?

However, proponents of this dilemma often overlook the continuity inherent in previous scientific revolutions, contrasting with a more radical, Kuhnian interpretation of science, which posits that revolutionary theories are entirely incommensurate with their predecessors. Einstein's theories did indeed represent a significant departure from Newtonian mechanics, but that does not imply that Newton would have been unable to grasp Einstein's ideas. Both were scientists employing mathematics and striving to unify phenomena through empirical theories.

Regardless of how physics evolves a millennium from now, if there exists some continuity in understanding between revolutions leading from present-day physics to future theories, then physicalism or naturalism does not become vacuous due to those prospective changes. Each shift will connect to prior norms, ensuring that no stage of physics will appear as a miraculous revelation, akin to Moses receiving divine commandments unexpectedly. Rather, scientific stages will build upon one another as our comprehension of nature advances.

Only if the theoretical progress were entirely discontinuous—such that each stage would be inexplicable to its predecessor—would it become arbitrary to assert that everything is natural according to our current understanding of "natural," meaning they are all physically grounded. Should future physicists posit spirits, angels, or deities, these entities would have to be defined in a manner that is at least consistent with contemporary physics. Otherwise, science would have concluded and been supplanted by theology.

This methodological reliance on objectification is how I define "natural." Nature encompasses that which can be elucidated through scientific objectification and thus potentially harnessed by human endeavors. This provides the continuity we seek to navigate Hempel's dilemma.

Additionally, a significant response involves cosmicism—an existential implication arising from scientific discoveries. For example, natural selection suggests that we are merely one among many species, all evolving within natural rather than supernatural boundaries. With that sobering realization, we should adopt a pragmatic outlook toward both science and philosophy. We must acknowledge that scientific models are simplifications, and even the most refined physics will never fully encapsulate reality. Reality will always surpass our imagination, intuition, and reasoning.

This does not imply that reality is supernatural; rather, the utility of partial objectifications and practical applications will enhance our pride as humanists, allowing us to persist despite the somber reality of our godless existence.

Prudence Louise:

My argument does not concern trivialities; it emphasizes the necessity of distinguishing between method and metaphysics. Naturalists habitually obscure this distinction.

Benjamin is no exception. We witness the same conflation of method and metaphysics. He acknowledges that naturalism represents the philosophical claim that everything is natural, yet he consistently references methodological principles.

He critiques my interpretation of Dawkins, asserting that the physical encompasses supervening layered properties. However, my arguments do not negate the existence of supervenience. My objections apply not only to extreme positions like positivism and eliminativism but to every variant of naturalism.

My assertion is that the only way we "observe" a world of relentless indifference is by first presuming that naturalism is accurate and that the scientific approach is the proper way to perceive reality. Benjamin retreats to method when he contends that Dawkins' argument indicates that "physicists do not need to posit teleological or moral properties."

However, what relevance do physicists' methodological practices hold when we are discussing a philosophical proposition? The fact that physicists do not need to posit those properties does not imply that those properties are non-existent.

This same blurring of method and metaphysics appears in Benjamin's response to Hempel's dilemma. He argues that naturalists can evade this dilemma because there will be "some continuity of understanding" at each stage of scientific advancement.

Yet he fails to clarify how the current stage will resemble its predecessor. What characteristic remains constant between each phase such that both can still be classified as physics? What does it mean to be examined by physics, or, in other words, what does "physical" signify?

To assert that future physics will be akin to past physics, albeit improved, conveys nothing substantial. It merely suggests that we anticipate progress in physics while failing to define what "physical" entails.

This response is, as has often been the case, an ambiguous gesture towards science to substantiate a claim about the entirety of existence. It is an appeal to the prestige of scientific methodology to legitimize a metaphysical stance.

Benjamin defines "nature" as "that which is physically grounded," but the term "physical" remains undefined.

He also defines nature as "what can be explained through scientific objectification." However, this reliance on science does not confirm that everything is natural, leaving open the possibility that supernatural entities exist beyond scientific explanation.

Moreover, it succumbs to Hempel's dilemma. We need not wait centuries to ascertain the nature of future physical laws; we can declare metaphysical naturalism false at this moment. Benjamin's definition culminates in a logical inconsistency, and nothing is more incommensurate than conceptual opposites. The one aspect we can never objectify is subjectivity or conscious experience.

Despite these challenges, and the further concern that if naturalism is true, "reality will always surpass our imagination, intuition, and reasoning," Benjamin maintains that the practical implications of science "enhance our pride as humanists." We may engage in a noble endeavor to persist, despite the tragedy of the philosophical perspective that views existence as a pitilessly indifferent reality.

I could not express it better myself. We now have three compelling reasons to reject naturalism: it is meaningless, it is false, and it portrays our existence as a tragedy unfolding in a world devoid of compassion.

Benjamin Cain:

Prudence's critique that naturalists engage in an illicit "slide" "between method and metaphysics" is a dead end.

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy states that self-identified philosophical naturalists "aimed to align philosophy more closely with science. They contended that reality is entirely composed of nature, containing nothing 'supernatural,' and that the scientific method should be employed to investigate all realms of reality, including the 'human spirit.'" Notably, the term "science" is referenced 42 times in that entry.

Thus, there is nothing inherently wrong with constructing a metaphysical framework based on scientific outputs and, indirectly, on scientific methodology. Neglecting how science operates would undermine naturalists, so they need not heed theistic counsel on metaphysics. Accepting such advice would be akin to a Democrat soliciting a Republican's guidance on winning an election.

The essence of naturalism is that we should derive our ontological insights from science. However, numerous scientific disciplines address different layers of nature's emergent properties. For instance, Dawkins claimed that cosmological evidence aligns with atheism or with a form of physics that does not require positing teleology or morality in the fundamental, physical domain.

Prudence misinterprets the relevance of supervenience when she argues that "the fact that physicists do not need to posit those properties does not entail that those properties do not exist." For the naturalist, those properties can exist at higher levels, which are addressed by the softer sciences.

When she queries, "What relevance do physicists' methodological practices have if we are discussing a philosophical claim?" it is essential to recognize that if we are specifically discussing a naturalist claim in philosophy, scientific methodologies are indeed pertinent, as the metaphysics of naturalism is intended to operate in conjunction with science, reflecting the entire tradition of analytic philosophy in the West.

Prudence critiques my response to Hempel's dilemma by stating that I do not specify "in what respect the current stage will resemble the previous stage." What I asserted is that the methods of objectification will be akin, and I did not overlook the obvious fact that the content will also remain continuous.

Thus, near-future physics will mirror present-day physics in that these scientists will engage with similar data and theoretical constructs. This remains true even if the content of future physics diverges significantly from current theories. If continuity exists in each revolutionary transition, we need not fear distant alienness; this could signify monumental progress.

If Prudence seeks insight into what future physics will resemble, her best approach would be to examine contemporary physics, given the methodological and semantic continuities I propose.

She claims that this is merely a vague gesture towards the prestige of scientific methodology to validate a metaphysical claim, as it leaves "physical" undefined. However, if you inquire of a present-day physicist how "physical" is defined or consult a physics textbook, you will encounter a wealth of details regarding matter and energy, space and time, and so on.

Moreover, Prudence contends that the appeal to scientific objectification "does not establish that everything is natural." A mere definition of "philosophical naturalism" or an exposition of the philosophy's coherence cannot disprove supernaturalism. That would be shifting the goalposts. What demonstrates the falsity of supernaturalism is the incoherence of theism and the absence of compelling evidence for miracle claims.

Naturalists remain open to being proven wrong in this regard; however, the challenges to naturalism have proven disappointing. For example, consciousness is not miraculous merely because it eludes direct objectification. Cognitive psychologists can elucidate consciousness in objective, scientific terms by illustrating how consciousness is contingent upon the brain and the process of evolution.

Prudence Louise:

Everyone is entitled to base their metaphysical interpretation of reality on whatever they choose. It is irrelevant whether naturalism's worldview derives from science or indirectly relies on scientific methods.

It is easy to urge others to accept that reality aligns with our assertions, but the rational method is crucial for determining whether that worldview is, in fact, true.

If metaphysical naturalism holds true, it implies the absence of God, souls, and an afterlife. These are not trivial assertions; they significantly affect our lives' purpose and what awaits us after death. Therefore, the question of their truth is of utmost importance. As Benjamin acknowledges, if naturalism is accurate, our lives devolve into tragedies in a heartless universe.

However, upon critically examining metaphysical naturalism's claims, we find them unsupported by the scientific method. They are not even substantiated by logic. Naturalism is merely an appreciation of science illegitimately extended to encompass all of reality.

We are asked to accept that everything is natural, yet the naturalist is unable to define what "natural" means. Even as they remain uncertain about their beliefs, they assert that reality is entirely comprised of that undefined substance. If we insist they clarify their terms, we discover that naturalism is either false or vacuous.

This is why I characterize naturalism as a dogmatic bias. Naturalists commence with the presumption of their metaphysics' truth. It is not a logical conclusion reached while attempting to explain observed phenomena. It is a method that disregards anything that cannot be elucidated through science, deeming it non-existent.

Benjamin deflects the obligation to substantiate naturalism's truth by stating that naturalism will not demonstrate that supernaturalism is false. But why wouldn't it? If we possess a coherent philosophy with sound reasoning supporting its truth, it logically implies that all contradictory metaphysical claims must be false.

The problem lies in the lack of compelling reasons to believe metaphysical naturalism is true. Benjamin cites theism and miracles as justification for dismissing supernaturalism. However, even if naturalists succeeded in proving those two phenomena do not exist, that would not suffice to assert that everything is natural.

Naturalists do not claim that some entities are natural or that those aspects of the world explainable through science are natural; they assert that everything is natural.

Naturalism is a claim that cannot be validated by science or logic. It transcends its conceptual boundaries to make an extra-natural assertion about the entirety of existence. It cannot even provide a definition for itself, as "nature" is not a meaningful category of existing entities; it is an arbitrary judgment based on an investigative method.

The plausibility of naturalism hinges on the conflation of method and metaphysics. This is why many believe that science has demonstrated the nonexistence of God and souls, when in fact, science has proven nothing of the sort. Naturalists misappropriate the explanatory authority of science and apply it to their metaphysical assertions.

Benjamin Cain:

To the best of my understanding, Prudence's principal objection to naturalism is that naturalists presume their generalizations rather than substantiating them with "science or logic." According to Prudence, naturalists merely assert that everything is natural because that is all the scientific method can establish.

However, as I indicated, that perspective aligns with positivism, not naturalism. Prudence fails to recognize that science encompasses more than a method; it constitutes an institution rooted in a secular humanistic culture. Naturalists’ confidence in the assertion that everything is natural derives not solely from a "slide" between "method and metaphysics" but also from their belief in their capacity to comprehend how everything interrelates.

Consider what it would entail to encounter something genuinely supernatural or miraculous. Such a miracle would lie outside the natural realm, rendering its operations unpredictable, inexplicable, and unmodelable. This miracle would undermine our claims to progress through rational thought and ingenuity.

The entirety of the natural universe already represents that humbling reality, with phenomena like quantum mechanics and black holes bordering on miraculous because they challenge our intuitions. Why, then, do we still categorize these phenomena as "natural"? Is that merely an empty pretense? We assume they are natural because scientists continue to study them, and we possess some understanding of their workings, evolution, and their position within the broader natural framework.

Prudence rebukes naturalists for their inability to define "natural." However, the contents of nature are not subject to human definitions. This is characteristic of theists who overly rely on their intuitions. Rather, the contents of nature are determined through scientific observations, models, and experiments.

Contrary to Prudence's interpretation, I did not claim that "of course naturalism won't show" that supernaturalism is false. My assertion was that merely defining naturalism or demonstrating its coherence does not suffice for such a refutation.

Prudence argues that metaphysical naturalism is not "supported by the scientific method," but why should it be? Naturalism is a philosophical stance, hence it is underpinned by philosophy. Naturalistic philosophers do not dismiss miracle claims simply because they do not appear in scientific literature. Rather, these philosophers engage in two pertinent actions: they study nature through science and dismantle the flawed arguments and superstitions proposed by theists.

The challenge for supernaturalists lies in the incoherence, antiquated nature, and fallacies inherent in theism. What would it mean for something to be a supernatural ghost in the machine? How would the two entities interact? What purpose would a miracle serve if it is impossible to comprehend? Wouldn't such a notion undermine the very goal of inquiry? And isn't it an equivocation to presume we understand miracles by assuming they result from the actions of a deity residing outside of time and space?

Naturalism does not represent a "dogmatic prejudice," as naturalists are not merely positivists. These philosophers actively scrutinize theistic arguments and miracle claims, finding them lacking. Even if only by default, this leaves us with naturalism as the prevailing viewpoint.